

Questionnaire for the EUFJE Conference 2012 at the Council of State of the Netherlands *The application of European environmental law by national courts:* Hungary

Part 1. The interrelation between EU (environmental) law, national law and national environmental courts

This part of the questionnaire deals with the view of national environmental courts on the interrelation between EU (environmental) law, national law and their role therein. In other words what is your view, as a national environmental court, of the EU legal order?

1.1 Introduction of the EU legal framework

It is settled case law of the ECJ that the EU forms an independent yet shared legal order. According to the European theoretical legal framework, the status of EU law 'versus' national law is dominated by three main principles: the principles of primacy, subsidiarity (art. 5(3) TEU) and of loyal cooperation (art. 4(3) TEU, also known as the general obligation of sincere cooperation). Any national (procedural) rule in conflict with Union law must be set aside or 'rendered inapplicable', also by the national courts (the so-called Simmenthal-duty (Case 106/77)). The role of a national court in the European legal order is that of a -supplementary- juge du droit commune. When legal redress is not possible before the ECJ, the national court will have to provide judicial protection of EU law in its Member State. As a European court and based on the principles of loyal cooperation and of effective legal protection, the national court has a dual task: a) to offer effective legal protection and b) to ensure the uniform application of EU law. The national court is obliged to give full effect to EU law provisions and protect rights conferred on individuals by these provisions, including if necessary the refusal of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national law. National courts have the responsibility to prevent the application of national law and decisions of administrative authorities when this is contrary to EU law. Although according to the legal fiction of the case law of the ECJ, it is for the ECJ to explain EU law and for the national courts to apply it, in practice national courts also explain EU law, if necessary assisted by the ECJ via the preliminary procedure.

1.2 Questions on the interrelation between EU (environmental) law, national law and national environmental courts

1.	l	consider myself	
	0	a European judge	
	0	a national judge	
	0	equally a national and European judge	
	0	a European judge, first, and then a national judge	
	0	a national judge, first, and then a European judge.	
2.	V	/hat is your view of EU law in general?	
	0	Very positive	
	0	Fairly positive	
	0	No opinion (don't know)	
	0	Fairly negative	
	0	Very negative	
3.	V	/hat is your view of EU environmental law in general?	
	0	Very positive	
	0	Fairly positive	
	0	No opinion (don't know)	
	0	Fairly negative	
	0	Very negative	
4.	Pı	ropositions on the your view of the your role as EU court:	
	a.	I consider my constitution of a higher order than	
		i. EU treaties;	Yes/ <u>no</u>
		ii. EU secondary law.	<u>Yes</u> /no
	b.	When judgments of the ECJ and the national supreme court conflict,	
		I will follow the ECJ.	Yes/no

c.	The principle of loyal cooperation is a guiding principle for the	
	National court.	<u>Yes</u> /no
5. Is	s the relationship between EU environmental law and national law in your country	
a.	codified in your national law?	Yes/ <u>no</u>
b.	acknowledged via national case law?	Yes/ <u>no</u>
# If ye	es, please indicate how:	

dif	ficu	ılt:								
	a.	to	set a	side any	national ru	le that is ir	onflict w	ith Europe	ean law	
		(the <i>Si</i>	mmentho	al-obligatio	n)?				<u>Yes</u> /no
	b.	to	offer	effective	e legal prote	ection of E	uropean la	w?		<u>Yes</u> /No
	c.	to	ensu	re the un	iform appli	ication of E	European la	aw?		<u>Yes</u> /No
1.3	3 <u>Q</u>	ues	tions (on the ro	le of EU la	w in natioi	nal environ	mental ca	<u>ises</u>	
7.					many case	-	court deci	de in the ք	period 1 January 201	1 - 1 January 2012?
	P	ieus	e man	tate the t	otal nambe	21.70				
8.	۱۳	, ho	w mai	ny of thes						
ο.	"	1110	w IIIaI	ly of the	se cases.					
	a.	w	as FU	(environ	mental) lav	v at issue?				
	u.				-		50-75%	75-90%	90-100%; 100%	
	b.				actually ap				30 100/0, 100/0	
	υ.					-			90-100%; 100%	
	c.			-	the basis of				30 100/0, 100/0	
	С.								90-100%; 100%	
9.	P								was at issue:	
٥.	а.		ivil cas		ine iii eine ey	pe or ease.			, regularly, mainly, a	all
	b.			l cases:				_	,, regularly, mainly, a	
	с.			strative c	ases.		<u>140</u>	_	er, rarely, regularly,	
	٠.			eral cases					arely, <u>regularly</u> , mai	
		ii.	_	ronmenta			Never. ı		ularly, mainly, all	,,
		iii.		ning law					ularly, mainly, all	
	d.			ntially:			_		, regularly, mainly, a	all
	u.	0		.c.uiry.			146	-c., raicly	, ,	a

6. What do you consider your task(s) with regard to EU law and do you consider these task(s) 'workable' or

If differently, please specify
Please indicate your type of court:
o civil court
o criminal court
o administrative court
 general administrative court
o environmental court
o planning law court
o differentially:
10. Please provide insight in the <i>top 5 of the most relevant topics</i> in EU environmental legislation in the cases in which EU law was at issue:
 Access to information/consultation/court
o Environmental impact assessment (such as EIA) 2
o Industrial emissions (IPPC/IED)
o Industrial accidents (post Seveso)
o Water 4
o Air 5
o Noise 5
o Products
o Chemicals
 New technologies (Bio-/nanotechnology)
o Nuclear
o Nature protection 3
O Waste management 1
o Climate change
o Renewable energy
o Differentially,
11. Please provide insight in the type of legal questions in which this EU (environmental) legislation was at issue in these cases:

o Procedural questions:

o <u>access to justice</u>

Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, all

0	legal r	emedies (reparation)	
0	differe	ently, namely	
o Mate	erial nori	ms:	Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, all
0	legalit	y of national law	
0	<u>legalit</u>	y of decisions/actions/sanctions impo	sed by national authorities
0	legalit	y of EU law	
o Diffe	rently, n	amely	
0	Differer	ntly,	
12. Please p	rovide ir	nsight how the EU law entered the env	rironmental case law. Was it relied on by:
	0	individuals	never, rarely, regularly, <u>mainly,</u> all
	0	companies	never, rarely, regularly, mainly, all
	0	NGOs	never, <u>rarely,</u> regularly, mainly, all
	0	the legislature	never, rarely, regularly, mainly, all
	0	national public authorities	never, <u>rarely,</u> regularly, mainly, all
	0	official third parties to the dispute	never, rarely, regularly, mainly, all
	0	differently: never	r, rarely, regularly, mainly, all

Part 2. The use of the ECJ mechanisms of application of EU law

2.1 Introduction of EU legal framework

This part of the questionnaire specifically focusses on the application of EU environmental directives in the cases your court decided in the period 1 January 2011 - 1 January 2012 in which EU law was at issue, as mentioned under 1.3.

Contrary to regulations and decisions, EU directives are never directly applicable in the legal order of a Member State upon their coming into effect (art. 288 TFEU). Directives are binding for the Member States as to the result which they aim to achieve and in principle require national implementation measures (art. 288 (3) TFEU). The implementation obligation of the Member States for directives consists of the duty to a) transpose its provisions in national law; b) to apply and c) to enforce the application of the directive —or the national implementation law- (art. 288 TFEU) and d) to offer effective legal protection (art. 19 TEU). The ECJ developed three —by now traditional- mechanisms to i) remedy flaws in the implementation (solve —potential- conflicts between national and Union law), and ii) so ensure the application (full effectiveness) of the directives irrespective of their nature and iii) give redress to individuals who consider themselves wronged by conduct amounting to fault on the part of the Member States. These mechanisms are: consistent interpretation, direct effect, and state liability, each with its own set of criteria and restrictions, to be applied in this order.

Consistent interpretation: When applying national law, national courts are obliged to interpret the whole body of rules of national law as far as possible in consistency with Union law. Consistent means 'in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive'. '[I]f the application of interpretative methods recognized by the national law enables, in certain circumstances, a provision of domestic law to be construed in such a way as to avoid conflict with another rule of domestic law, or the scope of that provision to be restricted to that end by applying it only in so far as it is compatible with the rule concerned, the national court is bound to use those methods in order to achieve the result sought by the directive.' This duty of consistent (or harmonious) interpretation applies:

- o to all national law, whether adopted before or after the directive in question;
- o to all Union law; and
- o In all kinds of relationships involved (including horizontal, inverse vertical).

However, the ECJ has limited the application of consistent interpretation via general principles of law, in particular the principles of legal certainty and non-retroactivity and the interpretation of national law *contra legem*.

Direct effect: Direct effect means that individuals can directly invoke a provision of primary or secondary Union law in the national legal order, including before a court). Whether a provision has direct effect depends on three conditions: 1) the EU legal instrument in which the provision is contained; 2) the content of the provision; and 3) the type of relationship involved.

Provisions of directives, as a rule, lack direct effect (ad 1), but they can have direct effect when they are sufficiently precise and unconditional (ad 2). Contrary to provisions of the Treaties and regulations, provisions of directives can only have direct effect in vertical relations and not in horizontal or inverse vertical relations (ad 3). However the latter was opened up for the so-called triangular relations in the case *Wells*, where Mrs. Wells (the plaintiff), appealed against a decision of a national public authority to grant a permit to a mining company (third party, here the permit holder), arguing that a provision of the EIA directive was breached by this decision (Case C-201/02). The ECJ decided that in such cases individuals can successfully invoke the direct

effect of the provisions of directives, as they are then applied vertically and *not* horizontally or inverse vertically, as invoking the directive merely had adverse horizontal side-effects. The negative effects for the mining company of the direct effect of the directive did not directly stem from the directive, but from the authorities' failure to fulfill its obligations under the directive.

When provisions in directives are not sufficiently precise and unconditional due to leaving a discretion to the Member States, they still can be applied by the national courts. The national court then must examine whether the national I public authority/legislator stayed within the margin of discretion left to the Member States in the EU law when exercising its powers (the so-called *Kraaijeveld*-test or legality review (Case C-72/95)). This test can perceived as a form of direct effect

During the implementation period: One final remark with regard to the mechanisms of consistent interpretation and direct effect is that they only apply with regard to directives once the period for transposition has expired. During the implementation period Member States 'must refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to compromise the attainment of the result prescribed by that directive'. The courts are to apply this test (the so-called *Inter-Environnement*-test (Case C-129/96)). The ECJ has applied it also for other transitional regimes in directives.

State liability: When the former two mechanisms fails and a provision of a directive cannot used by the national court via consistent interpretation or direct effect, state liability is the mechanism of last resort. But the European principle of state liability (also known as Francovich-liability (Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90)) can also be used as a separate mechanism to remedy infringements of Union law, such as the failure to implement directives correctly (transpose, apply, enforce). State liability of a Member State covers infringements by all the national authorities, including violation of EU law by the highest national courts (Köbler, Case C-224/01). The ECJ has set minimum- criteria, under which a Member State is to be considered liable before a national court. The criteria of the European principle of state liability for failure to implement directives are three-fold. Required are a) a sufficient serious breach of Union law; b) of a rule intended to confer rights on individuals; and c) a direct causal link between breach and damage. Except for the criteria as such (the right to reparation when the criteria are met), the EU mechanism of state liability must be applied (given effect) within the national procedural framework, including how an action for a breach of EU law is classified, the exact nature or degree of the infringement required for state liability, and the extent of reparation. Yet this national procedural framework is subject to the EU limitations of equivalence and effectiveness (see par. 4). When found liable, Member States are required to make good damages caused to individuals through implementation failures. Although reparation must cover the loss or damage sustained so as to ensure effective protection, the national law on liability provides the framework within which the State must mate reparation for the consequences of the loss and damage caused, provided this is in accordance with the aforementioned EU limitations

2.2 Questions on the application of the EU mechanisms to apply EU directives

13.	Please estimate how often your court considered an EU environmental directive not or incorrectly
	implemented, differentiating between the 3 elements of implementation
	(transposition/application/enforcement) in the cases in which EU law was at issue in the period 1 January
	2011-1 January 2012?

0	Transposition:	never, <u>rarely,</u> regularly, mainly	v, a
O	וומווטףטטונוטוו.	never, rarely, regularly, main	Ŋ

o Application: never, <u>rarely,</u> regularly, mainly, all

0	Enforce	ement:				ne	ver, <u>rarely</u>	, regularly, mainly, all	
-	-		-	-	actice and r	_		ify the implementation of	EU law
th	e period 1	L January	⁄ 2011-1 J	anuary 20	12, which o	of the three	e mechani	ourt where EU law was at i sms was/were applied by y directives?	
a.	Consiste	nt interp	retation:						
		<u>0-1%;</u>	1-10%;	10-25%;	25-50%;	50-75%;	75-90%;	90-100%; 100%	
b.	Direct e	ffect (inc	luding the	e 'Kraaijev	eld-test'):				
		<u>0-1%;</u>	1-10%;	10-25%;	25-50%;	50-75%;	75-90%;	90-100%; 100%	
C.	State lia	bility:							
		<u>0-1%;</u>	1-10%;	10-25%;	25-50%;	50-75%;	75-90%;	90-100%; 100%	
d.	During t	he transı	oosition/	transitiona	al periods:	the ' <i>Inter-l</i>	Environme	nt test'	
		<u>0-1%;</u>	1-10%;	10-25%;	25-50%;	50-75%;	75-90%;	90-100%; 100%	
e.	Differen	tly, name	ely						
		0-1%;	1-10%;	10-25%;	25-50%;	50-75%;	75-90%;	90-100%; 100%	
15. In	general, d	do you u	se one or	more of th	nese mecha	anisms wit	hin one ca	se?	
	0	One m	echanism	, or					
	0	Multip	le mechai	nisms					
Please explain	1								
16. In	general, i	f any, wł	nat is you	r court's o	rder of pre	ference:			
	0	Consist	ent inter	pretation/	direct effe	<u>ct</u>			
	0	Direct	effect/co	nsistent in	terpretatio	n			

Direct effect/consistent interpretation/state liability

Consistent interpretation/direct effect/state liability

	0	Differently, n	amely		
				cular legal & practical argume	ents are for your court's order of
ha	-			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	nsitional period in these directives nts' of these directives during these
a.	During t	he transpositio	n period		Yes/ <u>no</u>
b.	During o	other transition	al periods (s	such as extension periods)	Yes/ <u>no</u>
# If ye.	s, please e	explain, if possib	ole, <i>why</i> and	how (by illustrating the line	of reasoning used in such cases:
Why:					How:
•					
	-			e, how often this occurred in the which EU law was at issue?	the total cases of your court in the
0-1% ;	1-10%;	10-25%; 25-	50%; 50-7	75%; 75-90%; 90-100%; 10°	0%
cc th av	oncludes, one EU oblig vailable to	on the basis of gation to set asi	the EU mech de any natio	nanisms, that a EU directive w	r court have at its disposal when, it vas breached, in particular in view of U law? Please select the options lable.
Yo		is allowed to:			
0	to set a	<u>ıside (not apply</u>	<u>) the conflic</u>	ting national rule	
				consistent interpretation; of	direct effect;(EU) state liability
0	to decla	are that EU law	was breach	<u>ed</u>	
				consistent interpretation; of	direct effect;(EU) state liability
0	to force	e the legislature	to act		
				consistant interpretations	lirect effect;(EU) state liability
				•	meet effect,(EO) state hability
	0	give an order	to adopt leg	gislation	
				consistent interpretation; o	lirect effect;(EU) state liability
	0	give order to	act in a spec	cific way	
				consistent interpretation; of	direct effect;(EU) state liability
0	to annu	ul decisions			

consistent interpretation; direct effect;(EU) state liability

0	to revoke a consent al	ready granted	
		consistent interpretation; direct effect;(EU) st	ate liability
0	to suspend a consent a	already granted	
		consistent interpretation; direct effect;(EU) st	ate liability
0	to award damages		
		consistent interpretation; direct effect;(EU) st	ate liability
	o monetary cor	npensation	
		consistent interpretation; direct effect;(EU) st	ate liability
	o factual repara	ation	
		consistent interpretation; direct effect;(EU) st	ate liability
0	to offer interim relief		
		consistent interpretation; direct effect/(EU) st	ate liability
0		n) national exhaustive mandatory assessment systems, for in of grounds for refusing permits	stance by widening
		consistent interpretation; direct effect/(EU) st	ate liability
0	differently		
		consistent interpretation; direct effect/(EU) st	ate liability
If differ	ently,		
2.3 Que	stions on the application	on of consistent interpretation	
19. Prop	position: the mechanisn	n of consistent interpretation is an advantageous principle.	
<u>I strong</u>	<u>ly agree,</u> agree, neutra	l, disagree, strongly disagree	
20. Doe request	·	e mechanism of consistent interpretation <i>ex officio</i> (when pa <u>Ye</u>	arties did not e s/no
		was the mechanism of consistent interpretation considered was at issue in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012? Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always	non usable by your
# When	the mechanism of cons	sistent interpretation was considered <i>non usable</i> in these cas	ses, this was due to:
0	the principle of legal c	ertainty Never, rarely, regularly, main	nly, always

Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always

o other general principles of law

0	contra l	egem interpretatio	n		Neve	er, rarely, regula	arly, mainly,	always
0	the part	ties involved:						
	0	because the natio	-	-		-		ne directive to
					Neve	er, rarely, regula	arly, mainly,	always
	0	because the natio	-	-		· ·	retation of th	ne directive to
					Neve	er, rarely, regula	arly, mainly,	always
	0	in criminal procee determining of ag					ave had the	effect of
					Neve	er, rarely, regula	arly, mainly,	always
0	differen	itially, namely						
# If pos	sible, plea	ase illustrate the re	asons <i>why</i> o	consistent	interpreta	ation was <i>not us</i>	sable (the lin	nitations)
2011-1		te, in how many of 2012, did your cour tates?						
0	Use of i	nterpretation by ot	her courts o	of your cou	ıntry			
	<u>0-1%</u> ;	1-10%; 10-25%;	25-50%;	50-75%;	75-90%;	90-100%; 100	%	
0	Use of i	nterpretation by na	tional cour	ts of other	Member	States		
	<u>0-1%</u> ;	1-10%; 10-25%;	25-50%;	50-75%;	75-90%;	90-100%; 100	%	
# Please	e, if possi	ble, illustrate when	in particula	r the <i>latte</i>	r was the	case.		
		whether there is a						ational courts o

2.4 Questions on the application of direct effect

23. Propositions:

other Member States?

o The mechanism of direct effect is an advantageous principle.

Yes/No

I strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disag
--

o The criteria to establish whether or not a provision has direct effect are workable?

I strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree.

- 24. Please estimate how often your court establish the direct effect of provisions in a directive on the case law of other courts, in the case law where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012,
 - Use of case law of other courts of your country

Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always

Use of case law of national courts of other Member States

Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always

Please, if possible, illustrate when in particular the latter is the case.
Please indicate whether there is a <i>need for information</i> on the use of direct effect of EU environmental law by national courts of other Member States?
<u>Yes</u> /no

25. How often, as an estimate, did your court apply the mechanism of the *Kraaijeveld*-test (to examine whether the national public authorities stayed within the margin of discretion of provisions of directives) in the cases where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012?

Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always

26. How often, as an estimate, was the mechanism of direct effect considered non usable by your court in the cases where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012?

Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always

If the mechanism of consistent interpretation was considered non usable in these cases, please indicate the reasons why:

- Reason of legal certainty: never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always
- Prohibition of inverse direct effect (national public authority *versus* individual (incl. company/NGO)):
 never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always
- o Prohibition of horizontal direct effect (individual *versus* individual):

never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always

o Adverse horizontal side-effects of direct effect (Wells)

never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always

Differentially, namely

# If possible, please illustrate these reasons (the limitations), in particular of restrictions related to triangular situations (e.g. where the plaintiff (an individual) appeals, relying on EU law, against a decision of a national public authority granting a permit to another individual (the (in-) formal third party)				
27. Would you limit the use of the mechanism of direct effect by a national public authority and a company, regarding the refusal of this authority to grant an expermit to this company, based -ex officio- directly on a provision in a directive, when there not formally third parties, involved? Yes/no	environmental			
28. Would your court ex officio apply a provision of a directive that has direct effect (is sufprecise) in a case where there are potentially third parties (such as NGOs protecting gener environment) but none of these parties is formally party to the case? Yes/no				
2.5 Questions on the application of State liability				
29. Proposition: the mechanism of EU state liability is an advantageous mechanism.				
I strongly agree, <u>agree</u> , neutral, disagree, strongly disagree				
30. Is there also a national instrument of state liability for violations of EU law?	/es/ <u>no</u>			
# If yes, how often, as an estimate, was the national instrument of state liability used by you where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011- 1 January 2012?	our court in the cases			
0-1%; 1-10%; 10-25%; 25-50%; 50-75%; 75-90%; 90-100%; 100%				
# If yes, please respond to the following proposition: I prefer the national instrument of s EU mechanism.	tate liability over the			
I strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree.				
# Please indicate why:				
 Less stringent criteria 				
 More stringent criteria 				
More clarity criteria				
o Experience				
o Request parties				
o Differentially,				
# Please explain:				

31. In general, has the EU mechanism (or national instrument) of state liability ever been used for infringements of EU law by national courts for their judicial decisions (*Köbler*) in your country?

Yes/no

If yes,

o did these judicial decisions concern environmental cases?

Yes/no

o did they ever concern your court's judicial decisions?

Yes/no

If possible, please illustrate.....

32. Has an action based on the EU mechanism of state liability for an infringement of EU law ever been successful in the environmental case law of your court?

Yes/no

If no,

o has an action based on the *national* instrument of state liability for an infringement of EU law ever been successful in the environmental case law of *your court*?

Yes/no/don't know

- o by your knowledge, has an action based on the EU mechanism of state liability ever
 - been successful in the environmental case law of your country?

Yes/no/don't know

 by your knowledge, has as an action based on the *national* instrument of state liability for infringements of *national law* in environmental case law ever been successful in *your country*?

Yes/no/don't know

33. Does your court require from individuals (incl. companies/NGO's) that they minimize the damages they claim via a state liability action, meaning that they first should have relied on directly effective provisions of EU law in for instance an administrative procedure (make use of the legal remedies available)?

Yes/no

Part. 3. The (non)use of the preliminary procedure

3.1 Introduction of EU legal framework

The relationship between the EU courts, the ECJ and the national (environmental) courts, is codified in art. 267 TFEU (art. 234 TEC) on the preliminary procedure. When national courts encounter problems with the application of EU law they can or must request the ECJ for an interpretation of EU law, when the national court 'deems such an interpretation [of primary or secondary EU law] necessary for deciding a specific case'. The preliminary procedure may also concern the legality of secondary EU law as national courts are not allowed to rule on the legality of secondary EU law. Courts whose decisions can be appealed, have discretion to use the preliminary procedure, but national courts of last resort must refer. The national courts of last resort are merely relieved from this obligation to refer in case of: an acte clair or acte éclaire, being if the EU law is sufficiently clear respectively the legal issue has already been addressed by the ECJ (Cilfit, Case 283/81). Non-reference by the national court in last resort can result in EU state liability (Köbler).

3.2 Questions on the application of the preliminary procedure

34. Proposition: the preliminary procedure is a very useful.

<u>I strongly agre</u> e, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree					
	35. How many references for preliminary rulings were made in environmental cases in your country in the period 1 January 2008-1 January 2012?50				
# How	many of these references where made by your court?30				
36. Wh	at type(s) of preliminary questions were referred by your court?				
Questi	ons on:				
0	the interrelation between procedural law (procedural autonomy)	and EU law			
0	the use of the EU mechanisms of application of EU law				
0	material (environmental) EU law (for instance on interpretation, toprovisions)	the interrelation between EU legal			
0	differently namely,				
	n these requests are turned down, are the reasons always stated in the lecision)?	he ruling (for instance in a separate <u>Yes</u> /no			
38. 2008-1	Has your court ever withdrawn preliminary references in environm January 2012?	nental cases in the period 1 January Yes/ <u>no</u>			
# In thi	s period have your court's preliminary questions been:				
С	left unanswered by the ECJ?	Yes/no			
С	rephrased your court's preliminary questions in such a way				
	that they were no longer relevant for the referring case?	Yes/no			
# If yes	, please indicate the number of cases where this occurred, and, if po	ssible, illustrate			
39.	Does your court wait for the 'perfect' case to refer a (number of) s gh the legal questions concerning EU law are already raised in other (• • •			

If possible, please explain,

Yes/<u>no</u>

	•••••		
		en a question requiring preliminary ruling is raised in a certain case does your co dings:	urt stay the
	0	In that certain case:	Yes/no
	0	In all other cases pending, where this question is relevant:	Yes/ <u>no</u>
	oes y	your court stay the proceedings in a case when there are—for that case relevant-	preliminary questions
	0	by other courts of your country:	Yes/ <u>no</u>
	0	by courts of other countries:	Yes/ <u>no</u>
41.		Can the national (environmental) court always use the preliminary ruling in the	referring case? Yes/no
42.	Doe	s your court use are the preliminary rulings beyond the referring cases?	<u>Yes</u> /no
		es your court use the preliminary rulings based on referrals by other courts, inclu r States?	ding those of other <u>Yes</u> /no
cor		you ever in hindsight incorrectly decide not to refer a preliminary question to th red the Union law was irrelevant for the case or the relevant Union law was and	•
# Ij	f yes,	, did it give rise to an (EU) action of state liability (Köbler-claim)?	Yes/no
# W	/ould	d you be able, according to national (procedural) law to repair such a court decisi	ion? Yes/no
#If	poss	ible, please explain,	

Part 4. The interrelation between national procedural autonomy and EU (environmental) law

4.1 Introduction of the EU legal framework

The application of EU (environmental) law by national courts occurs within the context of national procedural law. National procedural law regulates *inter alia* the access to the court, the burden of proof, the intensity of judicial review, and the remedies offered by these courts. National procedural law however faces EU restrictions, as the national procedural law of 27 Member States –potentially – distorts the application of EU law.

These restrictions can be found in formal harmonization in EU law, for instance the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus), and in case law of the ECJ. The proposed directive to implement the so-called third-pillar of Aarhus, on access to justice, has (still) not been adopted, but it has been implemented in part, particularly in the context of the EIA and IPPC-directives (2003/35/EC and 2003/4/EC). Recently landmark cases on Aarhus clearly

limited the procedural autonomy on access to justice in environmental law. Specific harmonization can also be found in the Eco crime- and Eco liability-directives (2008/99/EC and 2004/35/EC).

In so far as there is no harmonization the general restrictions of the national procedural autonomy apply. These three general restrictions, which are principles based on standard ECJ case law, form the outer boundaries of national procedural law in 'EU law'- cases. There are the two 'mild' *Rewe*-principles, consisting of a) the principle of equivalence: national rules cannot be applied if they are less favorable if applied to cases involving the application of EU law than to comparable cases concerning only national law; and b) the principle of effectiveness: national rules cannot be applied if they make it (practically) impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law (Case 33/76). Violations of the principle of effectiveness can be justified by general principles of law such as legal certainty and the rights of defense (the so-called procedural 'rule of reason' or balancing test). The third restriction is the principle of effective legal protection, which requires an effective access to a court *as well* as an adequate system of remedies in place in the Member States in order to give effect to EU law (codified in article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and art. 19 TEU). This final principle has on occasion also resulted in new types of legal remedies.

National courts will have to check whether these principles restrict the application of national procedural rules in the cases before them (check if 'EU-proof'). The case law of the ECJ on the restrictions of national procedural law covers a wide range of procedural rules, varying from the access to justice (e.g. standing requirements, time limits, ex officio application of EU law), the burden of proof, the intensity of judicial review, and the remedies (types of court procedures and the types of legal effects). Several uncertainties however still remain with regard to the aforementioned restrictions, for instance on the relationship between the *Rewe* principles and the 'intensive' principle of effective legal protection; the role of the procedural rule of reason, as well as legal consequences of a breach of the restrictions, except for the *Simmenthal*-duty to set them aside.

4.2 Questions on the application of EU restrictions of the procedural autonomy

45. Please estimate in how many of the cases of your court in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012 where EU law was at issue, did the EU restrictions of the national procedural autonomy play a role:

<u>0-1%</u>; 1-10%; 10-25%; 25-50%; 50-75%; 75-90%; 90-100%; 100%

46. Please estimate in how many of the cases of your court in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012 where EU law was at issue did you consider any national procedural rule **not** to be 'EU-proof'

<u>0-1%</u>; 1-10%; 10-25%; 25-50%; 50-75%; 75-90%; 90-100%; 100%

If possible, please specify which of following restrictions played a role in this case law:

- o The principle of equivalence
- The principle of effectiveness
- The principle of effective legal protection
- Aarhus (including the Aarhus-case law by the ECJ)
- Secondary legislation:
 - Directive 2003/4 (Access to info)
 - o Directive 2003/35 (Public participation)

		0	Eco-liability directive	/e 2004/35		
		0	Eco-crime directive	2008/99		
	0	Europe	an Convention on Hu	ıman Rights		
	0	Differe	ntly,			
# Pl	eas	e illustrat	e the relevant genera	ally used legal cons	siderations in you	r case law:
47	۸ -			h	- in	although from the treatment of a sub-con-
47.			dural rule?	ne cases referred t	o in question 57 (did you find a justification for the use
		0-1%;	1-10%; 10-25%; 2	25-50%; 50-75%;	75-90%; 90-10	00%; 100%
		Please	pecify the justificati	on you found (use)?	
		0	the <i>procedural rule</i>	of reason (genera	l principles of law)
			legal certa	iinty		
			■ rights of d	efense		
		0	differently,			
48.				nt national (proced	dural) law that is/	could be infringing the EU restrictions,
	WIT	th regard				Vac In a Imayika
		a. a	cess to justice: o standing requires	rements:		<u>Yes</u> /no/maybe
			o time limits:			
			o <u>court fees,</u>			
			o length of proce	edings:		
			o ex officio appli	cation of EU law		
		0	the intensity of judi	icial review and		Yes/no/maybe
		0	burden of proof			Yes/no/ <u>maybe</u>
		0	legal remedies:			Yes/no/maybe
			a tunos of judicio	l roviou / logal rov	iou or claims sole	aly based on breach of Union law)

o differently,
To your knowledge is there any <i>future</i> national (procedural) law that could infringe the EU restrictions? Yes/ <u>no</u>
If yes, please explain
49. According to the ECJ case law on the national procedural law a <i>national competence = an European obligation</i> . In your view what has the impact been of this case law on your court's environmental case law? None/ <u>little/moderate/fairly big/very big</u>
If possible, please illustrate

the judicial competences (the types of judgments/decision national courts may deliver (sanctioning/legal redress) & aim of judicial review: for instance dispute settlement?

If judges from different courts from the same member state are participating each of them can fill in the questionnaire as his or here court is concerned

Please send your answers to the general rapporteur Ms. Liselotte Smorenburgvan Middelkoop as soon as possible and **on September 10**th **at the latest** (answers received after that date cannot be incorporated in het general

report): L.vanMiddelkoop@uva.nl